PuNITrvE DAMAGES IN MARITIME TORTS:
EXAMINING SHIPOWNERS' PUNITIVE DAMAGE LIABILITY
IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ DECISION

Aaron T. Duff*
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than twenty years have passed since the tanker Exxon Valdez struck a reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling its cargo of
crude oil throughout the sound and devastating the ecosystem of the
surrounding waters and coastline.' As a result of the spill, the Exxon
Corporation ("Exxon") has been the target of myriad civil and criminal lawsuits arising from the environmental damage wrought by the
oil discharge.2 The civil suits comprising the claims of thousands of
plaintiffs, were ultimately consolidated into a single suit. 3 Exxon was

assessed punitive damages in the amount of $5 billion-the largest
punitive damage award in United States history.4 The punitive damage award raised three important issues for the Supreme Court's consideration on writ of certiorari: (1) whether the quantum of the punitive damage award was excessive under American admiralty law, (2)
whether an award of punitive damages was preempted by the Clean
Water Act,' and (3) whether punitive damages against non-complicit
principals for the actions of their agents was appropriate in the realm
of maritime torts. 6
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In re The Exxon Valdez (Remand II), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (D.
Alaska
2004).
2 See id. at 1078-79; see also In re The Exxon Valdez (Exxon
1), 270 F.3d 1215,
1223-24 (9th Cir. 2001).

Remand 11, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
See Exxon 1, 270 F.3d at 1225.
5 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1274 (2000).
6 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 492, 492 (2008) (granting
certiorari on these three issues and denying certiorari on other issues); Exxon Shipping Co.
3

4
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case on October 29, 2007, 7 heard oral argument on February 27, 2008, and finally rendered its decision on June 25, 2008.8 The Court vacated the
punitive damages award, holding that Exxon's liability for punitive
damages should be limited to $507.5 million, a sum equivalent to Exxon's total compensatory damage liability. 9 The Court's ruling was
based on maritime common law, not on constitutional due process
grounds.° The Court did not rule on the question of whether a shipowner could be held derivatively liable for punitive damages based
on its captain's misconduct, absent the owner's complicity." TheJustices were evenly split four-to-four on this issue, Justice Alito having
recused himself due to a financial conflict of interest. 12 As a result,
the Ninth Circuit's decision to allow such derivative liability was
upheld and remained undisturbed but with no precedential effect.13
Therefore, there currently exists a split in the U.S. circuit courts of
held liable
appeals as to whether non-complicit shipowners may1 be
4
for punitive damages based on their captains' conduct.
In light of this extant controversy, this Comment explores the
history of the Exxon Valdez litigation and analyzes the development of
the doctrine of shipowners' punitive liability in admiralty. Part II of
this Comment details the tragic story of one of the largest maritime
oil spills in U.S. history and the subsequent litigation that arose from
the catastrophe. Part III traces the evolution of the doctrine of punitive liability in maritime law, examining both Supreme Court and
U.S. circuit courts of appeals precedent. Part IV identifies various
policy concerns unique to the field of admiralty law militating against
the imposition of punitive damages against non-complicit shipowners
for the acts of their agents. Finally, Part V concludes that U.S. maritime interests are ill-served by a regime under which non-complicit
v. Baker (Exxon V), 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 (2008). What this Comment will term the
"complicity doctrine" in maritime law was coined by the Supreme Court in 1818 and
requires that a shipowner commit an independent act or omission that contributed
to the damage incurred before that shipowner may be found liable for punitive damages based on his conduct. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558-59
(1818).
7 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at
492.
8 Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. at 2605.
9 Id. at 2634.
10 Id. at 2626.

1 Id. at 2616.

12

Id. at 2611; Robert Barnes, Justices Assess FinancialDamages in Exxon Valdez Case,

WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 2008, at A02.
13 See Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. at 2616.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 80-106.
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shipowners may be held liable in punitive damages solely on the basis
of the reckless and wanton acts of their captains when the owners
have otherwise neither participated in nor countenanced the wrongful conduct. Such a result would expose maritime shippers to potentially catastrophic liability due to the poorjudgment of their agents at
sea over whom they have little or no day-to-day supervisory power.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE
EXXON VALDEZ LITIGATION

A.

Facts

Although tales of the sea chronicling calamitous events typically
begin by conjuring up images of "a dark and stormy night,"'6 on the
evening of March 23, 1989, when the tanker Exxon Valdez left the
port of Valdez, Alaska, laden with over 1.2 million barrels of crude
oil, only a slight drizzle fell and a light breeze of ten knots swept over
Prince William Sound. 7 The vessel slipped its last mooring line and
departed the dock at 9:21 p.m., proceeding under the direction of a
harbor pilot through the Valdez Narrows, which form the entrance to
Valdez Harbor. 8 After navigating through the narrows, the harbor
pilot disembarked and Captain Joseph Hazelwood took command of
the Exxon Valdez.""
Upon taking control of the ship, Hazelwood navigated the tanker so as to avoid a large accumulation of ice within the shipping
lanes. 2 The course that Hazelwood took set the tanker on a direct
course for Bligh Reef, a well-recognized, well-marked navigational hazard that easily could have been avoided by a simple course adjust-

1

Although the Supreme Court limited punitive liability to a one-to-one ratio be-

tween compensatory and punitive damages, as will be shown, such liability may still
be sufficient to impede maritime commerce due to such factors as the uninsurability
of punitive damages. See infra note 125.
16 EDWARD BULWER LYrrON, PAUL CLIFFORD 1 (1874).

The expression, "a dark
and stormy night," has since become the archetypal example of fnelodramatic fiction
writing. See The Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/it-was-a-darkand-stormy-night.html (last visitedJan. 31, 2009).
17 ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE ExxoN
VALDEZ IMPLICATIONS
FOR SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF OIL: FINAL REPORT 5-14 (1990).
18

Id.

19 Id.

Exxon I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). None of the plaintiffs contended
that navigating the vessel outside of the shipping lanes was an imprudent course of
action. Id. In fact, due to the presence of the ice in the shipping lanes, Hazelwood's
decision was ajudicious one. Id.
20
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ment.2' Although Hazelwood was the only seaman licensed to navigate the vessel through this particular part of Prince William Sound,
he left the ship in command of the third mate, Gregory Cousins, and
retired to his cabin after setting the autopilot and instructed Cousins
to perform the maneuver necessary to avoid the reef.22 Shortly after
midnight on March 24, a scant twelve minutes after Hazelwood left
the ship's bridge, the Exxon Valdez allided 23 with Bligh Reef, tearing
a hole in the vessel's hull through which approximately eleven million gallons of oil escaped.24
The third mate's attempts to turn the ship away from the reef
and back toward the traffic lanes had come too late.2 ' Cousins had
failed to follow Hazelwood's orders in commencing the necessary
course correction at the time instructed and, upon realizing his mis2 6
Altake, had insufficient time to steer the ship clear of danger.
though Cousins had completed the necessary requisites for licensure
as a captain, his failure to perform the navigational maneuver commanded could be explained as a product of overwork and fatigue.2 7
At the time of the allision, Cousins should have already been relieved,
but his replacement had not yet arrived. 2 According to Exxon's policies, Cousins should not have been left on the bridge unaccompanied,2" and Hazelwood's decision to do so might be best explained by
an examination of the captain's activities on the day of the accident.
Captain Hazelwood was an alcoholic; he had sought treatment in
a rehabilitation program but had relapsed and continued drinking.3 °
It was later established that Hazelwood had spent the afternoon of
March 23, prior to the ship's departure, drinking at two different bars

21

Id. at 1221-22.

22 Id. at 1222-23.
23 An allision occurs when a ship comes into contact with a fixed object.

See
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed. 2004). "Collision" refers to contact between two
or more movable vessels. Id. at 281.
24 Exxon I, 270 F.3d at 1223; ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, supra
note 17, at 5-14.
25 Remand 11, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (D. Alaska 2004).
26

Id.

27 Id. at 1077; see also Exxon I, 270 F.3d at 1223.

Testimony before the National
Transportation Safety Board indicated that Cousins may have been awake for eighteen hours prior to the grounding. SeeALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, supra note 17, at 514. Studies show a direct correlation between fatigue and human error and that at
least eighty percent of marine accidents are attributable to such error. Id. Cousins's
lack of sleep at the time of the accident could have caused fatigue that contributed to
the ship's grounding. Id.
28 Exxon 1, 270 F.3d
at 1223.
ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, supra note 17, at 5-14.
30 Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1076-77; see also Exxon
I, 270 F.3d at 1223.
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in Valdez. 3' Testimony at trial alleged that prior to boarding the ship
on the night of the accident, Hazelwood had consumed "[approximately] fifteen ounces of eighty proof alcohol. 3 2 Considering these
allegations, it could reasonably be assumed that Hazelwood's excessive consumption of alcohol prior to the vessel's departure influenced his decision to relinquish command of the Exxon Valdez.33
B. ProceduralHistory
Prior to the commencement of any litigation against the corporation, Exxon voluntarily settled over $300 million in potential claims
with owners of affected property, fishermen, and others.34 Exxon was
subsequently prosecuted by the federal government on charges of violating several criminal environmental-protection statutes.' In addition to the criminal prosecution, the State of Alaska and the federal
government brought a civil suit against Exxon for environmental injuries caused by the spill, which resulted in a consent decree mandating Exxon pay $900 million to restore afflicted natural resources. "
Private plaintiffs brought hundreds of civil lawsuits against Exxon in
state and federal courts.37 These suits were ultimately consolidated
and a single plaintiff class was certified, comprising commercial fishermen, local property owners, and native Alaskans. 3 The plaintiff
class sought punitive damages against both Hazelwood and the Exxon Corporation as his employer. 9 After deliberating for over three

31

ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N,

supra note 17, at 5-14; Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d at

1076.

Exxon I, 270 F.3d at 1223.
Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. Although Captain Hazelwood was not convicted for the crime of operating a watercraft while intoxicated, there was substantial
evidence that Hazelwood took command of the ship while under the influence of
alcohol. Id. at 1079; see also Exxon I, 270 F.3d at 1236-37.
34 Exxon 1, 270 F.3d at
1223.
35 Exxon was charged with violating the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311 (a),
32

33

1319(c)(1)

(2000), the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411(2000), the Migratory Bird

Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a) (2000), the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1) (2000), and the Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C. § 3718(b)
(2000). Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. Exxon pled guilty to violating the Clean
Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and was required to pay
$125 million in fines and restitution. Id.
3
Exxon 1, 270 F.3d at 1223. Exxon had already spent over $2 billion in an
effort
to remove the oil from Prince William Sound and its adjacent shorelines, as well as
from birds and other wildlife that had come into contact with the oil. Id.
37

Id. at 1223-24.

38

Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1079-80; see also Exxon , 270 F.3d at
1225.
Remand I, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1079-80.

39
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weeks, the jury returned a "breath-taking" $5 billion punitive damage
award against Exxon. 0
In a series of appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and subsequent remands to the district court, the
punitive damages award was eventually reduced to $2.5 billion-a
remittitur compelled by Supreme Court precedent regarding the due
process limitations on punitive damage verdicts. 4' Exxon petitioned
the court of appeals for rehearing en banc, but the petition was denied over the dissents of Judges Kozinski and Bea.42 On August 20,
2007, Exxon petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for
certiorari to resolve the issue of its punitive damage liability. 43 The

Court granted the writ on October 29, 2007, to determine whether
punitive damages against Exxon were appropriate under American
admiralty law." In the Court's June 25, 2008 decision, the Court substantially remitted the punitive damage award but split on the issue of
whether Exxon should have been liable for punitive damages based
40
41

Id. at 1082.
In re The Exxon Valdez (Exxon II1), 472 F.3d 600, 607-12, 625 (9th Cir. 2006).

In the first appeal (Exxon 1), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
remanded for reconsideration in light of the due process limitations on punitive
damages announced by the Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996), and Cooper Industries., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S 424
(2001). Exxon 1, 270 F.3d at 1246-47. The district court, though failing to recognize
"any principled means by which it c[ould] reduce th[e] award," nevertheless remitted the punitive damage assessment to four billion dollars. In re The Exxon Valdez
(Remand 1), 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002). Exxon appealed the district court's remitter, and the court of appeals once again remanded the case to be
considered in light of the Supreme Court's more recent decision in State Farm v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. (Exxon I),
No. 30-35166, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18219, at *1-2 (9th Cir. 2003). On remand, the
district court construed State Farm to justify a punitive damage award of four and a
half billion dollars against Exxon. Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. Finally, motivated by the desire to conclude this "protracted litigation," the court of appeals remitted the award to two and a half billion dollars-an amount more "appropriate...
under the prevailing legal precedent." Exxon Il, 472 F.3d at 625.
42 In reThe Exxon Valdez (Exxon IV), 490 F.3d 1066, 1068
(9th Cir. 2007). This
Comment advocates the same principle that motivated Judge Kozinski to dissent-to
wit, that the goal of uniformity in the law regulating maritime commerce militates
against finding a non-complicit shipowner liable for the acts and omissions of its captain. See id. at 1071 (Kozinski,J., dissenting). The aim of this Comment is to expand
upon, lend support to, and demonstrate the veracity of the Judge's eloquent and
well-reasoned opinion. Judge Bea would have disallowed the punitive damage award
for the same reasons as Judge Kozinski, but noted that even were punitive damages
appropriate, the size of the award was notjustified by Exxon's conduct. Id. at 107172 (BeaJ., dissenting).
43 Elizabeth Bluemink, Exxon Takes Spill Appeal to the Supreme Court,
ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 22, 2007, at Al.
44 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 492
(2008).
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solely on Captain Hazelwood's conduct.4 5 The Court's ruling left intact the Ninth Circuit's decision that permitted punitive damages
against non-complicit shipowners and failed to resolve the circuit split
regarding the propriety of such damages under maritime law.46
II.

HISTORY OF SHIPOWNERS' PUNITIVE LIABILITY
IN MARITIME TORTS

The question of shipowners' liability for punitive damages in
maritime torts, despite holding crucial importance to the maritime
shipping industry, has been infrequently addressed by U.S. courts.
The earliest Supreme Court decision examining the issue dates from
the early nineteenth century and stands as the Court's only precedent
squarely addressing the question. 7 In the nearly 200 years since that
decision was announced, only seven cases dealing with shipowner liability for punitive damages have reached the U.S. circuit courts of appeals.48 In addressing the question of the extent of a shipowner's liability for punitive damages, these courts have developed the maritime
doctrine of complicity. 49 Under this paradigm, only those shipowners

who are otherwise at fault to some degree for their captains' conduct
will be amenable to punitive damage liability. As the following subsections will illustrate, only the Ninth Circuit has eschewed the complicity doctrine, much to the potential detriment of the maritime
shipping industry. The Supreme Court should have corrected the
course of the Ninth Circuit, pulling the court into line with the prevailing complicity doctrine of American admiralty law.
Ninth CircuitJurisprudence

A.

The Ninth Circuit decision to allow vicarious liability to run
against Exxon for the acts of its captain was made possible by the
court's prior ruling in Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pacific
Grain Growers, Inc.5 ° Protectus Alpha involved the liability of a dock
owner for punitive damages arising from the grossly negligent acts of
its dock foreman."' When a fire broke out on the plaintiffs ship as it
was fueling at the defendant's dock facility, the dock foreman, ignoring the efforts of the Coast Guard and firefighters to extinguish the
See Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2616, 2634 (2008).
Id. at 2616; see infta text accompanying notes 80-106.
47 See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
4 See infra notes 50, 67, 80, 87, 92, 99, and 108.
49 See Exxon IV, 490 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
'0 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985); see Exxon I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001).
51 ProtectusAlpha, 767 F.2d at 1381.
45

46
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blaze, ordered the ship cast off from its mooring.52 The ship, now inaccessible to the firefighters on land, perished in flames.
In assessing punitive damages against the dock owner, the Ninth
Circuit adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard for imposing punitive damages on principals for the acts of their agents.54
Under that rubric, "[p]unitive damages can properly be awarded
against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent
if ...the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting
within the scope of [his or her] employment."5 5 This test allows punitive damages to be assessed against a principal for the acts of agents
engaged in their managerial capacities, regardless of any culpability
on the part of the principal.
In adopting the Restatement standard, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "no reasonable distinction can be made between the guilt
of the [agent] in a managerial capacity acting within the scope of his
employment and the guilt of the [principal]

.'

Applying this reason-

ing to maritime law, the court noted that punitive damages had long
been recognized in admiralty; 58 however, the court did not address
the crucial issue of whether punitive damages may be imposed

Id.
Id. at 1381-82.
54 Id. at 1386.
52

53

§ 909(c) (1979). This standard also allows
punitive liability for an agent's acts that are either directed or ratified by the principal and for acts of an unfit agent when the principal was reckless in employing him.
Id. § 909(a), (b), (d).
A managerial agent is generally defined as one possessing broad discretion to
make policy decisions without seeking approval from his principal. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. e (2006) (citations omitted). The question of whether a ship's captain is properly characterized as a managerial employee is open to
some debate. Compare Belote v. Maritrans Operating Partners, L.P., No. 97-3993,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3571 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1998) (finding a barge captain to be
the shipowner's managerial agent), with Inre Silver Fox, Inc., No. A97-168, 1998 U.S.
Dist.LEXIS (D. Alaska June 15, 1998) (finding a fishing vessel's captain not a managerial agent for purposes of limiting liability). Because Exxon did not dispute the
trial court's decision that Hazelwood was a managerial agent, see In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A-89-0096-CV, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12953, at *8 n.8 (D. Alaska Jan. 27,
1995), this Comment assumes that a ship's master is properly classified as a managerial agent, though such agency should not suffice to impute punitive liability in the
shipowner-captain context. Such liability should run against a shipowner only if the
owner is complicit in the captain's wrongful conduct.
56 Protectus Alpha Navigation Co.v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379,
1386-87 (9th Cir. 1985).
57 Id. at 1386.
58 Id. at 1385.
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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against non-complicit principals under maritime tort law. 59 In failing to
do so, the court ignored the important policy implications of its decision. Instead, the court satisfied itself with the dubious contention
that its decision better reflected "the reality of modern corporate
America." 6°
In its haste to conform to the progressive trend of land-based
tort doctrine, the Ninth Circuit completely ignored longstanding Supreme Court precedent concerning a shipowner's punitive liability in
maritime tort. 6' The Supreme Court's seminal decision in The Amiable Nancy62 held that a shipowner could not be held liable for punitive
63
damages based on the wrongful conduct of its officers and seamen.
The Amiable Nancy established the doctrine that a shipowner who "neither directed . . . nor countenanced . . . nor participated in" the
wrongful conduct of its officers and crew, though liable to make
compensation for the injuries sustained by reason of its employees'64
conduct, cannot be "bound to the extent of [punitive] damages."
This doctrine, requiring some degree of culpability on the part of a
shipowner before punitive liability may attach, has been embraced by
every other circuit court to address the issue. 65
Besides ignoring established Supreme Court precedent, the Protectus Alpha court also contradicted a previous Ninth Circuit decision
regarding the propriety of assessing punitive damages against noncomplicit shipowners for the acts of their captains at sea.66 In Pacific
Packing & Navigation Co. v. Fielding,6 a three-judge panel of the Ninth
59 Had the court inquired into the pertinent question of vicarious punitive liability instead of punitive liability in general, it would have discovered that imposition of
such liability is disfavored in maritime law. See 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 1
ADMIRALTiY & MARITIME LAw

§ 5-17 (4th ed. 2004).

Protectus Alpha, 767 F.2d at 1386. Although the Ninth Circuit panel justified
its
adoption of the Restatement standard by demonstrating that a majority of courts
recognize the availability of punitive damages against a principal for the acts of its
agents in the absence of the principal's ratification or approval, the court did not examine whether any of those courts extended the principle to the realm of admiralty
law. Id. Had the court done so, it would have found no support for such extension
from its sister circuits. See Exxon IV, 490 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
61 See Exxon IV, 490 F.3d at 1069 n.1 (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
62 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
63 Id. at 558-59.
64 Id. at 559. The controversy arose out of the tortious conduct of
the crew of the
privateer brig Scourge who were alleged to have "robbed and plundered" the captain
and crewmembers of the Haitian schooner The Amiable Nancy. Id. at 547.
r5 See Exxon IV, 490 F.3d at 1069-70 (Kozinski,J.,
dissenting).
66 Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d
1379,
1386 (9th Cir. 1985).
67 136 F. 577 (9th Cir. 1905).
60
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Circuit refused to extend punitive liability to a non-complicit shi681
powner. In that case, a ship's captain imprisoned the ship's purser6 9
maliciously and without probable cause during the course of a voyage
from Dutch Harbor, Alaska, to Seattle, Washington. °
The court in Pacific Packingwas faced with the task of addressing
the shipowner's liability for punitive damages in light of Supreme
Court dictum suggesting that an agent who holds executive power in
a corporation-such as a president, general manager, or vice president in their place-represents the corporation to such a degree that
"any wanton, malicious, or oppressive" act of the agent should be imputed to the corporation itself.7" Recognizing that this doctrine
might be sound as applied to corporate executives, the panel refused
to extend such liability to captains of seagoing vessels even though
these agents exercise "sole and absolute command of the [owners']
ship[s] and of everybody in [them] . ' 72 In so holding, the court rec-

ognized7 the vitality of the complicity rule announced in The Amiable
Nancy. 3

The Protectus Alpha court's departure from the panel's reasoning
in Pacific Packingcannot be viewed simply as a court overruling prior
precedent. Under established Ninth Circuit protocol, whenever decisions of two different panels are in conflict, the court is required to
hear the case en banc to resolve the split. 74 A three-judge panel may

overturn a previous panel's contrary ruling only "when an intervening Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the
Ninth Circuit, and both cases are closely on point., 75
In upholding the Protectus Alpha court's ruling, the court in Exxon I held that the Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,76 which held that, consistent with due process,
punitive damages could be assessed against a non-complicit corporation, sufficiently undermined the prior Ninth Circuit ruling in Pacific

8

69

Id. at 580.
A purser is "[a] person in charge of accounts and documents on a ship."

BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1272 (8th ed. 2004).
70 Pac.Packing & Navigation Co.,
136 F. at 577-78.
71
72

Id. at 580 (quoting Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114 (1893)).
Id.

73 Id.

See United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(per curiam).
74

Exxon I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Gay, 967
F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992)).
76 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
75
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Packing to obviate the need for en banc review." The Exxon I court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that Haslip did not implicate
admiralty law and concerned constitutional due process rights as opposed to specialized doctrines of maritime law. 78 The court's finding
that Haslip undermined Pacific Packing rested in part on the justification that the "considerations bearing on the constitutional question"
addressed in Haslip could not be distinguished from the concerns
bearing on the maritime law question with which Pacific Packingwas
concerned.79 However, concerns unique to the field of maritime law
militate toward a distinctly different outcome than that reached by
the Haslip and Exxon I courts.
B.

Circuit Split

By ignoring long-recognized principles of maritime law proscribing the imposition of punitive damages against non-complicit shipowners, the Ninth Circuit stands in conflict with all other U.S. circuit courts of appeals that have addressed the question. The first
circuit court to rule on the issue was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in The State of Missouri.s° The court in that case was
asked to determine the liability of a shipowner for the ship's master's
abduction of forty stevedores8 ' and subsequent impression of those
stevedores into involuntary servitude aboard the vessel.82
In assessing the shipowner's liability, the court found that the
master's tortious conduct was committed in the course of his employment and on behalf of the shipowner. 83 Having so concluded,
the court held that the shipowner was answerable for the master's act,
stating that under established admiralty principles "the owners of a
vessel are liable for all injuries caused by the misconduct, negligence,
or unskillfulness of the master, provided the act be done while acting
within the scope of his authority as master.,8 4 In recognizing that a

principal may be held liable for its agents' acts under maritime law,
the court acknowledged the clear limitation of this liability to compensatory damages. 85 The Seventh Circuit, without even citing The
77 Exxon
78

Id.

79

Id.

1, 270 F.3d at 1236.

8076 F. 376 (7th Cir. 1896).
81 A

stevedore is a harbor worker who loads and unloads ships. BLACK'S LAW

DICIONARY 1454 (8thed. 2004).

The State of Missouri, 76 F. at 378.
Id. at 378-79.
8
Id. at 379.
8 Id. at 380.
82
83
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Amiable Nancy, held "[u] ndoubtedly the damages to be awarded must
be compensatory, and not exemplary, where recovery is sought
against the master for the unauthorized tort of the servant,"8" indicating how firmly ingrained the maritime doctrine of complicity had become in the seventy-eight years since the Supreme Court's seminal
decision.
The issue of a shipowner's punitive liability in maritime tort was
not raised for circuit court review until seventy-three years later, when
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided United States
Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman.87 That case involved a tragic collision between
two vessels in the Straits of Mackinac, which resulted in the deaths of
ten crewmen. 88 When the representatives of the deceased crewmen
brought suit seeking punitive damages from the U.S. Steel Corporation, the owner of one of the vessels involved in the collision, the
court of appeals declined to hold the corporation liable for such
damages.8 9 The court found the better rule to be "that punitive damages are not recoverable against the owner of a vessel for the act of
the master unless it can be shown that the owner authorized or ratified the acts of the master either before or after the accident." 90
When the Ninth Circuit issued its Protectus Alpha opinion in 1985, it
did not cite to the Sixth Circuit Fuhrman decision or the Seventh Circuit Missouri ruling, 9' even though those cases were existing circuit
court precedents directly on point.
After Protectus Alpha, the next case to consider the question of a
principal's punitive liability in the realm of maritime torts was In re P
& E Boat Rentals, Inc.92 This controversy arose from a fatal collision
between two vessels in dense fog on the Mississippi River." In rejecting a claim for punitive damages against Chevron, Inc., which had
86 Id.

407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1144.
89 Id. at 1148.
90 Id. The court also held that punitive damages would
be appropriate where the
master was unfit for command and the shipowner was reckless in employing him-a
holding sanctioned by the Restatement standard adopted in the Ninth Circuit in Protectus Alpha. Id.; see also Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers,
Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(b)
(1979). Although it is possible that Exxon might have been reckless in employing
Captain Hazelwood, knowing he was a relapsed alcoholic, the jury was not required
to make such a finding in order to hold Exxon liable. See Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. 2605,
2615 n.3 (2008).
91 See Protectus Alpha Navigation Co., 767 F.2d
at 1379.
92 872 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1989).
93 Id. at 644-45.
87
8
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chartered one of the involved vessels,94 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit decision in Protectus Alpha' and adopted the rule announced in Fuhrman that a shipowner
will not be held liable for punitive damages unless the owner authorized or ratified the master's actions. 96 The court reasoned that
where an agent "decides on his [or her] own to engage in malicious
or outrageous conduct . . . . the [principal] itself cannot be considered the wrongdoer." 97 This theory of liability, the court opined,
showed more fidelity to the guidance of the Supreme Court in The
Amiable Nancy
than the doctrine espoused by the Ninth Circuit in Pro8
tectus Alpha.9
Other than the Ninth Circuit in In re The Exxon Valdez, the most
recent circuit court of appeals to consider whether to assess punitive
damages against a shipowner was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer (ON 675048).99 CEHinvolved
a suit brought by lobsternnen for compensatory and punitive damages
against a shipowner and his captains' °0 for both negligent and willful
destruction of the plaintiffs lobster trapping equipment."0 '
The
court, in reaching its holding, questioned the continued validity of
The Amiable Nancy complicity doctrine, opining that no discernible
reason exists for treating punitive damage liability differently in admiralty law than in land-based civil actions. 0 2 Still, the court was unwilling to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard for a
principal's punitive liability because "read literally, [this standard]

Although a time charterer is generally not subject to an owner's liabilities, Stephenson v. Star-Kist Caribe, 598 F.2d 676, 679 (1st Cir. 1979), it can be held so liable
if it is "found negligent, not as owner or operator of [the] vessel, but as time charterer." In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d at 647. Because a Chevron employee
had ordered the ship's captain to operate the vessel at high speed in dense fog, Chevron was liable for its negligence as a time charterer, not as an owner or operator. Id.
at 647-48.
95 In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d at 652.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. This conclusion is not surprising considering that the Protectus
Alpha court
did not recognize the Supreme Court's instruction from The Amiable Nancy. See supra
text accompanying notes 62-66.
99 70 F.3d 694 (1st Cir. 1995).
100The defendants were "draggers"-fishermen who drag for fish by dropping a
net beyond the stern of the ship. Id. at 697.
94

10" Id. at 696-97.

1I2 Id. at 704. The defendants in this case presented no policy argument
for treating torts in admiralty differently than land-based torts for vicarious punitive damage

purposes. Id.
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that do not demonstrate any
could impose liability in circumstances
01 3
fault on the part of the principal."'
The First Circuit's disinclination to impose punitive liability
without any fault on the part of the principal led it to adopt a more
restrictive approach. This approach would permit punitive damage
awards against a principal for its agent's acts only when the agent is
employed in a managerial capacity, the agent acts within the scope of
his or her employment, and the principal is in some way culpable for
the misconduct. 10 4 The court in CEH found that the defendant shipowner was complicit enough in his agents' wrongful acts to justify
the imposition of punitive damages. 105 Of particular importance to
the court was the shipowner's complete failure to provide "any policy
directive . . . regarding the operation of [the] vessels in lobster trawl

areas,"'

6

in light of the owner's awareness that the atmosphere in

which he hired his captains to work was "characterized ...by the ten-

sion that raged between lobstermen and draggers."l 7
The Restatement StandardApplied to the Exxon Valdez Litigation

C.

The Ninth Circuit's decision to abandon the traditional complicity doctrine of punitive liability in maritime law, and to embrace the
Restatement standard instead, proved central to the Exxon Ijury's determination of the punitive damage question. Following the Ninth
Circuit's vicarious liability paradigm set forth in Protectus Alpha, the
Exxon Ijury was instructed that a "corporation is .. .responsible for
the reckless acts of... [its] employees who are employed in a managerial capacity while acting in the scope of their employment."'0 8 In
examining the propriety of this instruction, the Exxon I court conceded "that if the jury granted punitive damages on the basis of the
vicarious liability instructions discussed above, Exxon's own reckless103Id. at 705.

104 Id. Again, it is manifestly possible that Exxon could
have been found culpable
for Hazelwood's conduct due to the corporation's alleged awareness of his alcohol
abuse. See supra note 90. However, under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, no such finding was required for the jury to assess punitive damages against the corporation, so
long as it found Hazelwood to be a managerial employee working within the scope of

his employment at the time of the accident. See Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614
(2008); Exxon I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001).
105 CEH, Inc.,

70 F.3d at 705.
Id. In contrast, at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, Exxon had a published
policy prohibiting performance of duty while intoxicated as well as a policy for not
terminating those employees with alcohol problems who seek rehabilitation and
treatment. See Exxon I, 270 F.3d at 1238.
106

CEH, Inc., 70 F.3d at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108Exxon 1,270 F.3d at 1233 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107
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ness["'] would not be essential to the outcome.' 1 0 The court also
considered the possibility that instead of basing the punitive damages
award on vicarious liability, "the jury may well have granted" punitive
damages based on Exxon's negligent hiring practices or failure to supervise Hazelwood."'
As the court of appeals recognized, the instructions given the
jury could have supported a punitive damages verdict against Exxon
regardless of the corporation's reckless conduct." 2 This outcome is
irreconcilable with The Amiable Nancy's complicity rule which requires
some level of culpability on the part of a shipowner before punitive
liability may attach." 3 The Exxon I court, unlike its predecessor in
Protectus Alpha, could not ignore the blatant contradiction with The
Amiable Nancy's complicity rule that the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence
implicates," 4 and was forced to reconcile its decision with Supreme
Court precedent.
In order to reach a conclusion contrary to the clear command of
the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit distinguished The Amiable Nancy as having "no application to the case at bar" 115 because Exxon
could not claim to be in similar standing as the defendant in that

Under Protectus Alpha, Hazelwood's position as a managerial employee would
have been sufficient to impute liability to the corporation under a direct liability
theory. See Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d
1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that "no reasonable distinction can be made between the guilt of the employee in a managerial capacity acting within the scope of
his employment and the guilt of the corporation"). The Exxon I court affirmed the
assignation of punitive liability to the corporation on the basis of Exxon's reckless
failure to enforce Exxon's explicit alcohol policies and to supervise Hazelwood. Exxon I, 270 F.3d at 1237-38. The crucial flaw in the court's reasoning is that the jury
never actually determined whether Exxon's corporate officers were reckless in failing
to supervise Hazelwood or enforce company policy. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. But see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
110 Exxon I, 270 F.3d at 1237.
109

Id. (emphasis added).

See id. While the question of whether an award of punitive damages against a
corporation, such as Exxon, under a direct liability theory is a matter of some debate,
112

see 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAw OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES--EQuITY-REsTITUTION,

PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES § 3.11(6), at 495 n.6 (2d ed. 1993), it would not seem
reasonable or equitable to condition the availability of punitive damages on the shipowner's choice of his operational enterprise structure. Therefore, holding a corporate principal liable for punitive damages based on nothing more than its captain's
wrongful conduct would be just as irreconcilable with The Amiable Nancy's complicity
rule, which requires some wrongful conduct on the part of the principal, as holding
an individual shipowner liable for such agent's acts.
13 See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
546, 559 (1818).
14 Exxon 1, 270 F.3d
at 1234.
115

Id.
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116

case.
According to the court, the shipowner in The Amiable Nancy,
unlike Exxon who gave command of a tanker to a known alcoholic,
"neither directed ...nor countenanced ... nor ... participated in
the slightest degree in the wrong."1 17 The court's statement, although
arguably accurate, does not address the fundamental flaw in Ninth
Circuit jurisprudence regarding shipowners' punitive liability in maritime law: while the jury clearly could have found Exxon to have recklessly employed or failed to supervise Hazelwood-thus justifying the
award of punitive damages under the established Amiable Nancy doctrine-the Ninth Circuit's 1985 decision in Protectus Alpha would
sanction the award of punitive damages, regardless of whether or not
Exxon had acted recklessly.1 8 In order to impose punitive damages
under the Ninth Circuit rubric, a plaintiff need only show that an officer of the ship in discharging his managerial duty acted recklessly
and caused the injury at issue. This outcome not only contradicts
well-settled admiralty jurisprudence but also fails to take into account
important policy concerns, particular to the maritime realm, that
compel a more restrained approach to a shipowner's punitive liability.
III. MARITIME POLICY RATIONALES FOR PROSCRIBING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AGAINST NON-COMPLICIT SHIPOWNERS

Both on land and on the water, the principles behind imposing
punitive damages on a principal for the acts of its agents are to punish the principal for its conduct and deter similar conduct in the future." 9 Where a principal is not complicit in its agents' acts and no
additional harm is likely to occur; however, imposing punitive damages for the sole purpose of punishment of the principal is pointless
and unjust. 120 Therefore, unless a punitive damages award will produce a deterrent effect on the principal's future conduct, the purposes of such an award are not served. 121 Irrespective of the deter116
117

Id.
Id. (quoting The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 559) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (omissions in original).
I18 See Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2615 n.3 (2008). As the Supreme Court has made
clear, when it is not discernable whether ajury's decision to impose liability rested on
a proper or improper ground, the judgment cannot stand. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1993); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970).
I9 SeeDOBBs, supra note 112, § 3.11(1)-(3), at 455, 467-82.
120 See id. § 3.11 (6), at 497.
1
See id. The deterrence rationale for imposing punitive damages is much
stronger in situations where a financial incentive exists for the defendant to continue
in the wrongful course of conduct-especially where the wrongdoer is able pay all
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rence benefits of such a system in land-based tort law, admiralty
courts have generally declined to impose punitive liability on noncomplicit shipowners for the acts of their captains at sea.'2 2 As the following subsections show, concerns unique to the field of maritime
law justify these courts' decisions to proscribe non-complicit shipowners' punitive liability for the acts of its agents.
A.

Need to Establish Uniform Admiralty Rules Promoting
Maritime Trade

The interests of maritime commerce militate in favor of establishing a uniform national policy prohibiting the imposition of punitive damages on non-complicit shipowners for the acts or omissions
of their vessels' masters. From the time of the Union's inception,
American lawmakers have recognized that forcing vessels to adapt to
varying standards of liability as they move in interstate or international commerce would lead to "intolerable restrictions" on the maritime
shipping industry. 2 3 Toward this aim, the U.S. Constitution created
"a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the
whole country" that would ensure the uniformity and consistency necessary to maintain the vitality of maritime commerce between the
states and foreign nations. 124
Uniformity is necessary to the maritime shipping industry because it enables shippers to calculate their risks, adjust their insurance coverage to their potential exposure, and plan the scale and extent of their operations accordingly.' 25
Commercial carriers'

potential compensatory damages associated with the wrongful conduct and still realize a profit. Id. at 496-97. Exxon clearly has little incentive to encourage intoxication among its tanker captains-a fact which is demonstrated by Exxon's promulgation of corporate policies prohibiting crewmembers from consuming alcohol prior to
performing any of their duties. See Exxon I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001). As
there is no significant financial benefit to be derived by Exxon in allowing their
tanker captains to command company vessels under the influence of alcohol, any deterrence rationale is extremely attenuated in this case.
1

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 reporter's note
e (2006).

American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 466-67 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123

124

The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875).

Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of Seeking
"Uniformity" and "LegislativeIntent" in Maritime PersonalInjury Cases, 55 LA. L. REV. 745,
765 (1995). Force contends that in the unique setting of maritime personal injury
law-where liability is based more on status than on contract principles-uniformity
should not be slavishly pursued. Id. at 765-66. Although in the maritime commercial context, courts should properly seek to encourage uniform application of admiralty law. Id.
125
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operations would be severely hampered due to uncertainty if vessels
were exposed to varying rules of liability as they moved from port to
port. 26 In addition to the problem of uncertainty, in many jurisdictions punitive damages are not insurable, which virtually guarantees
that carriers will have no means to indemnify themselves against potentially catastrophic losses.' 27 For these reasons, a uniform national
policy proscribing non-complicit shipowners' punitive liability would
greatly facilitate interstate maritime commerce. As has been recognized by the Supreme Court and every circuit besides the Ninth that
has considered the issue of a shipowner's vicarious liability, maritime
industry and trade is best served by precluding awards of punitive
damages against non-complicit shipowners for the acts of their captains at sea.128 In light of these concerns and the history of the doc-

trine, the Supreme Court should overrule the Ninth Circuit's attempt
to establish a more liberal punitive damage regime and prescribe a
uniform maritime standard of complicity for shipowners' liability.
The need for uniform application of the law in the realm of maritime shipping is especially pertinent due to the international nature
of the industry. Over ninety percent of world trade occurs via the international shipping industry, comprising more than fifty thousand
merchant ships registered in over 150 countries and crewed by over
one million seamen of virtually every nationality.'29 This global interconnection requires domestic admiralty courts to consider the law of
foreign countries "so as to maintain a common maritime practice
among nations."'2 30 Although there is no global consensus, most civil
law countries generally disfavor the application of punitive damages

Id. at 765.
See Gary S. Franklin, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart
out of "Smart Money,"40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 979, 1000-04 (1986); see also The Amiable
Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558-59 (1818) (due to the fact that public policy has
placed responsibility upon shipowners for the conduct of their crew and because of
the "nature of the service," shipowners "can scarcely ever be able to secure to themselves an adequate indemnity in cases of loss").
128 SeeExxon IV, 490 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
1
Maritime International Secretariat Services Ltd. (MARISEC), Key Facts: Overview of the International Shipping Industry, available at http://www.marisec.org/
shippingfacts/keyfacts/?SID=570dd776f41f1 783990a3f463aead275 (last visited Jan. 8,
2009).
130 ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., ADMIRALTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 127 (2004). Jarvis
126
M

explains that the "eclectic and historic" sources of maritime law, derived from ancient legal texts, form the basis for modern international maritime shipping law. Id.
Because foreign nations continue to rely on these same generative sources, it is appropriate for American courts to consider the judgments of other nations when determining domestic admiralty policy. Id.
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in civil suits.13 ' In the great majority of civil law countries, punitive
damages are not available in noncriminal proceedings and plaintiffs
32
are limited to compensatory relief.1
Similarly, international law
generally rejects the imposition of punitive damages, although
in cer33
tain cases of deliberate misconduct, they may be assessed.
The four largest trading partners of the United States-Canada,
Mexico, China, and Japan134--do not impose punitive liability on innocent principals for the acts of their agents. Canadian courts, although recognizing the availability of punitive damages against a
principal for its agents' acts, do not allow assessment of punitive
damages based on vicarious fault. 135 Mexican law does not recognize
punitive damages in civil suits, only permitting such awards in criminal cases. 36 Although no specific provisions exist in China's legal
code dealing with punitive damages, implications from the General
Principles of Civil Law and the Contract Law indicate that Chinese
courts will grant only compensatory damages. 137 Of the United
States's principal trading partners, perhaps none takes a more negative view on punitive damages than Japan. Not only does Japanese
law forbid punitive damages but also such awards are proscribed as
against public policy, leading Japanese courts to refuse
enforcement
38
of foreign judgments that impose punitive penalties.
In addition to U.S. trading partners, those nations owning and
operating the world's largest fleets disdain the imposition of punitive
damages. In addition to China and Japan, Greece and Germany
131 See John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive
Damages: Is the
Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 508 (2007) [hereinafter Gotanda,
CharteringDevelopments].
132 John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative
Analysis, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 396 (2004).
133 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Responsibility and
Liability for Environmental Damage
Under International Law: Issues and Trends, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REv. 279, 301
(1998) (discussing international remedial schemes in environmental pollution cas-

es).

U.S. Census Bureau, Top Ten Countries with which the U.S. Trades: For
the
month of September 2008, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2008/09/
balance.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
135 See, e.g., 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Indus. Canada
Inc., [2000] 46 O.R.3d
760 (Can.) (imposing vicarious liability for compensatory damages but refusing to
1

extend vicarious liability to punitive damage award because of the principal's lack of

knowledge or participation).
136 Edith Z. Friedler, MoralDamages in Mexican
Law: A ComparativeApproach, 8 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 235, 253 (1986).
137 Guangjian Tu, The Hague Choice of Court Convention-A
Chinese Perspective, 55
AN.J. COMP. L. 347, 363 (2007).

See Takao Tateishi, Recent Japanese Case Law in Relation to InternationalArbitration, 17J. INT'L ARB. 63, 71-72 (2000).
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comprise the four largest beneficial owner'39 nations of the worldwide
shipping fleet. 14 These nations own close to half of the vessels employed in the global shipping industry.' 4' Greece, the largest beneficial owner country, does not recognize the availability of punitive
damages in civil suits.

42

Germany, much like Japan, shuns punitive

damages as a matter of public policy and has also refused to enforce
foreign judgments that include a punitive damage award. 143 In light
of the predominant global aversion to punitive damage awards, the
Supreme Court should establish a uniform nationwide consensus rejecting the imposition of non-complicit shipowners' punitive liability.
Failure to do so would negatively impact international maritime
commerce by requiring vessels to either adapt to varying remedial regimes or discontinue shipping operations in the vast waters of the
Ninth Circuit. 144
B.

Rule BJurisdiction

Another concern particular to the field of admiralty law is the
potential for expansive jurisdiction to which defendants may be exposed by means of quasi-in-rem attachments. A quasi-in-rem (or Rule
B) attachment is a procedural mechanism, unique to the law of admiralty, by which a plaintiff may seize a defendant's property, forcing
the defendant to choose between forfeiting the property (usually his
ship) and defending the claim. 145 Because most shipowners will
refuse to forfeit their vessels, in practice, a plaintiff may use Rule B to
obtain jurisdiction over a defendant with no connections to the district in which the court lies, other than the mere fact that his ship
happens to be found in the district's territorial waters. 14"
' Through
means of a quasi-in-rem attachment, a plaintiff may attach a shipowner's vessel wherever that owner's vessel may be found within the na-

A "beneficial owner" is one who receives the ultimate financial benefit derived
from a vessel's operation. J. Bennett Fox, Jr., Vessel Ownership and Terrorism:Requiring
Disclosureof Beneficial Ownership Is Not the Answer, 4 LOY. MAR. LJ. 92, 92 n.1 (2005).
140
Marine International Secretariat Services Ltd. (MARISEC), Shipping and
World Trade: Top 20 Beneficial Ownership Countries, http://www.marisec.org/
shippingfacts/worldtrade/top-20-beneficial-ownership-countries.php (last visited Jan.
8,2009).
141 See id.
142
See Gotanda, ChartingDevelopments,supra note 131, at 510 n.16.
143 Id. at 518.
144 SeeExxon IV, 490 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Kozinski,J., dissenting).
145
Robert M. Jarnis, An Introduction to Maritime Attachment Practice Under Rule B, 20
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 521, 521 (1989).
146 See FED. R. Cr'. P. SUPP. R. B(1).
'19
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tion's territorial waters as long as his suit arises under U.S. admiralty
jurisdiction. 147
The impact of Rule B is even more significant due to some
courts' interpretation of the rule to allow attachment of intangible
res. 14 According to this rubric, a plaintiff may seize a shipowner's assets that merely pass through an intermediary financial institution
within the district's jurisdiction. 149 If a court in the Ninth Circuit
adopted this understanding of Rule B, a shipowner might have its financial assets seized within the Ninth Circuit's waters, regardless of
the assets' connection to the asserted wrong, and be forced to litigate
"50
under the unforgiving ProtectusAlpha punitive damage regime.
The potential for forum shopping resulting from the disparity
between the circuits created by ProtectusAlpha and perpetuated by the
Ninth Circuit's Exxon Valdez decision '5' is clearly inimical to the national interests in establishing a "system of law coextensive with, and
operating uniformly in, the whole country."'' 52 The expansive reach
of Rule B jurisdiction renders it even more likely that a defendant will
be subject to various and contrasting tort regimes in the course of its
business. Were the Supreme Court to allow the Ninth Circuit Exxon
decision to stand, international shippers with no connection to the
Ninth Circuit may find their operations "shipwrecked""153 by massive
punitive damage liability based solely on the presence of their vessels
in the circuit's waters or the passage of their assets through a financial institution in the circuit.
C. Limitation of Liability
In the development of maritime law, limitation of liability has

been a key concern in shaping admiralty doctrines. 154 To that end,
SeeJillian L. Benda, No Calm After the Storm: The Rise of the Rule B Attachment Cottage Industry, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 95, 99 (2007); see also Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v.
Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that "maritime actors must reasonably expect to be sued where their property may be found").
See, e.g., Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263, 276, 278 (2d Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 927 (2003) (declaring a bank account amenable to Rule
B attachment and permitting attachment of an electronic fund transfer).
149 See id. at 278.
150 See id. at 268, 273-74.
147

151

Exxon TV, 490 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007).

152 The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875).
153 Exxon IV, 490 F.3d at 1071 (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
154 JARVIS ET AL., supra note 130, at 299 ("Since medieval times, countries
have

sought to encourage investment in the maritime industry through laws that limit the
financial liability of shipowners in the event of catastrophic loss or damage."); cf Ex-
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both domestic legislation and international conventions have been
adopted to insulate shipowners from devastating losses occasioned by
their seaborne activities. 155 Courts have given these policy considerations great weight in formulating federal maritime law. 156
Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of disproval of punitive
damages in the oil discharge arena is the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) ,17
which provides for the limitation of a shipowner's liability from damages arising from an oil spill.15

This statute, motivated by the Exxon

Valdez spill, established a comprehensive federal scheme to deal with
the issue of liability for the wrongful discharge of oil. 1 9" Congress
enacted the statute with the primary objectives of "benefitting the victims of oil pollution and punishing its perpetrators."'" Despite these
obvious motivations, courts have interpreted the OPA to preclude an
award of punitive damages. 161 While the OPA clearly could not be retroactively applied to obviate the award of punitive damages in Exxon
Valdez, it does reflect the policy that tanker operators should not be
amenable to excessive punitive damage awards.
Other statutes have gone even further in insulating shipowners
from oppressive civil damage awards. Two frequently invoked statutes in admiralty law clearly manifest Congress's recognition and acceptance of the complicity doctrine, even in the realm of compensa162
tory damages. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)
provides that a shipowner is not liable for loss or damage to cargo resulting from the "[a] ct, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the manageecutive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 270 (1972) (refusing to extend
admiralty jurisdiction to ajet crash in Lake Erie, noting that, unlike in the aviation
context, "through long experience, the law of the sea" has been sensitive to unique
concerns such as limiting liability).
155See infra text accompanying notes 157-169.
56 Cf Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1991) (The Court
refused to
allow non-pecuniary damages for the wrongful death of a seaman under general maritime law in light of congressional policy to preclude such recovery under the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (2002): "We will not create, tnder our admiralty powers, a
remedy that is disfavored by a clear majority of the States and that goes well beyond
the limits of Congress' ordered system of recovery for seamen's injury and death.").
157 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2764 (1990).
158 See id. § 2704.
159 Southport Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd., 234 F.3d 58, 64 (Ist Cir. 2000).
160 Id. at 66.
161 Id. Although the statute eliminates traditional liability
limitations in instances
of willful misconduct or gross negligence, it stops short of permitting punitive damages against a shipowner who engages in such conduct. Id.; see Oil Pollution Act, 33
U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (1990).
162 46 U.S.C.S. § 30701
(2007).
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ment of the ship."'63 Additionally, a shipowner's total liability for
damage to or destruction of cargo is limited to $500 per package. 64
The Limitation of Liability Act (LOLA) 165 allows a shipowner, under
certain circumstances, to insulate himself from liability exceeding the
value of his ship and its cargo at the time of loss. "6 An owner may
limit his liability with regard to all losses occasioned by those acts
done "without the privity or knowledge of the owner." 67 These statutes demonstrate a legislative commitment to allowing shippers the
ability to limit their exposure to catastrophic claims, at least to the extent that they are unaware of and uninvolved in the loss.
In addition to domestic policy militating toward limiting liability,
international consensus also sanctions the objective of limiting the
potential liability of maritime shipping concerns. The Convention on
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims permits shipowners to limit liability unless "it is proved that the loss resulted from [the owner's]
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such
loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably
result.'1 8 Such a regime clearly does not sanction vicarious liability
absent complicity of the shipowner. The International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) contains identical
language, allowing limitation for losses not caused by the shipowner's

163

Id. § 30701(4) (2) (a).
§ 30701(4) (5).
46 U.S.C.A. §§ 30501-30512 (2006).
Id. § 30505 (a).
Id. § 30505(b). Courts have held that under this standard, where a vessel own-

164 Id.
165

166
167

er does not exert control over its master's conduct at sea, the acts of the master are
done "without the privity or knowledge of the owner." See In re Hellenic Inc., 252
F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2001). Exxon did not invoke LOLA in this litigation; Justice
Stevens opined in his dissent that the explanation for the company's failure to invoke
the Act is that Exxon "recognized the futility of attempting to establish that it lacked
privity or knowledge of Captain Hazelwood's drinking." Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. 2605,
2635-36 (2008) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Stevens recognized, however, the alternative explanation that Exxon would not have been able to limit its liability for damages arising
from the Valdez spill under the Ninth Circuit's holding that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1976), impliedly repealed LOLA with
respect to trans-Alaska oil transportation. See id. at 2636 (citing In reThe Glacier Bay,
944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991)). Despite the abrogation of LOLA in this discrete
situation, "the Limitation of Liability Act reflects a very strong Federal policy about
restricting liability on shipowners... intended to encourage.., the maritime economy." Transcript of Oral Argument at 64-65, Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-291),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/
07-219.pdf.
168
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims art. 4, Nov. 19,
1976, 1456 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol of 1996, May 3, 1996.
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reckless or intentional personal act or omission.'69 Most of the
world's major maritime powers have ratified the CLC,170 evincing a
clear concurrence of opinion that non-complicit shipowners should
not be held liable for the potentially enormous environmental damage inherent in oil spills.
IV. CONCLUSION

The wreck of the Exxon Valdez and the subsequent discharge of
oil into the pristine Prince William Sound was a truly staggering environmental tragedy, causing widespread destruction of wildlife and
disrupting the livelihoods of many Alaskan fishermen.17' The Exxon
Corporation clearly bore a great share of the responsibility for the reRealizing its responsibility, Exsulting environmental catastrophe.'
xon initiated a massive cleanup project, expending over $2 billion to
remediate the afflicted ecosystem. 73 In addition to this program, Exxon paid over $800 million to compensate those Alaskans whose lives
and businesses were impaired by the accident.1 74 Despite this substantial compensation, the Exxon Valdezjury took advantage of the Ninth
Circuit's permissive vicarious liability system to award their fellow
Alaskans billions of dollars in punitive damages.175 In so doing, the
jury demonstrated the inherent flaw in the Ninth Circuit's vicarious
punitive damage paradigm, which undermines the uniformity of maritime law and the objective of protecting maritime commerce to
which admiralty law strives.
Under the Ninth Circuit's misguided formulation, a principal
may be subject to harsh punitive liability simply because it unfortunately hired a captain whose acts are construed by ajury after the fact
to have been reckless.176 In the perilous world of open-ocean ship169

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art. 5,

Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27, 1992.
170 SeeJARVIS ET AL., supra note 130, at 756. Although the United States has not
ratified this convention, and thus Exxon could not invoke its protections, the ratification by the world's major maritime powers indicates acceptance of the general maritime law principle that a shipowner should not be held liable for the acts or omissions of his agents in which the owner did not participate.
171 Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (D. Alaska 2004);
see ALASKA OIL SPILL
COMM'N, supra note 17, at 5-14 (characterizing the spill as the biggest U.S. environmental disaster since the Three Mile Island nuclear plant meltdown).
172 Remand I, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1077.
173 Exxon V, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
174 Remand II, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1078, 1101 (resulting in $303 million in
voluntary
settlements and over $500 million in compensatory damage awards).
175 Exxon 1T, 490 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
176

Id. at 1070-71.
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ping, accidents are inevitable due to the fact that "ships sink, collide,
and run aground--often because of serious mistakes by captain and
crew." 7 7 To impose punitive liability on shipowners when the accident at issue is unpredictable human error 17 completely ignores one
of the core purposes of punitive damages-to deter similar conduct
in the future. 179 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
while demonstrating admirable solicitude to victims of tragedy, failed
to recognize that no policy goal is furthered by punishing an actor for
conduct in which he takes no part, in an effort to deter future accidents8 ° that, due to the very nature of his business, cannot be obviated.
Perpetuation of this standard could potentially severely hamper
national and international maritime trade. Because of the four-tof~ur split among the Justices in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court
missed an opportunity to determine whether the Restatement standard of derivative liability should be extended to the field of admiralty law. As this Comment argues, such uncertainty on this crucial
question is detrimental to the nation's maritime commercial interests. Hopefully, the Court in a future case will correct the aberration
in the law of maritime torts illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's Exxon
Valdez decision and assure shippers operating throughout the nation's waters that they will not be exposed to harsh punitive damage
liability arising from inevitable accidents occurring on the high seas
when the owners themselves are not complicit in their agent's wrongful conduct. Until that day, however, maritime shippers will continue
to navigate uncertain seas as they conduct the business of supplying
the world with necessary fuel, commodities, and consumer goods.

177

178

Id. at 1070.

Remand I, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1077 (D. Alaska 2002) ("[I]t is entirely clear

why the Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef: the cause was pure and simple human frailty."); see also ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, supra note 17, at 5-14 (citing study
finding over eighty percent of maritime accidents attributable to human error).
WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971); DOBBS, supra
note
112, at 476-82.
180 In Exxon's case, it is difficult to imagine that any deterrence
beyond the $3.1
billion that the corporation spent to remediate the harm caused by the spill and
compensate its victims would be necessary to "teach[] [Exxon] not to do it again."
See Exxon I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223-26 (9th Cir. 2001); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 9.
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